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Dr. Babette Babich is a Professor in the Philosophy Department at Fordham University where
she has taught since 1989. Her work focuses on Continental philosophy, especially Nietzsche
and Heidegger, philosophy of science, as well as politics and aesthetics. Her books include
Nietzsche‘s Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground of Art and Life; Words in

Blood, Like Flowers: Philosophy and Poetry, Music and Eros in Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and
Heidegger , and her most recent, Nietzsches Wissenshaftsphilosophie . She is the Executive
Editor of New Nietzsche Studies , a journal she founded in 1994.

PURLIEU: As the editors of Purlieu we have been accused of
attempting something superfluous — or even detrimental — to the
field of philosophy. Among the charges leveled against us, some
critics have claimed that we risk diluting the rigor demanded of our
discipline and that we thus compromise its integrity. As the editor of
seven books and the founding and Executive Editor of New Nietzsche
Studies, what can you tell us about our duties as editors? More
generally, what is the value and the future of academic publishing,
both with periodicals as well as books?

BABICH: These are excellent questions, and as is often the case with
excellent questions, I find more than just a few queries packed into what
you say. And it is because you have just started a journal (and because I
have founded not just one but two journals, one founded as an
undergraduate, which continued after I graduated for several years before it
vanished, as well as New Nietzsche Studies, which you mention above and
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which of course continues), I take your first set of questions as very
important indeed. Because such issues are rarely addressed in the
profession and because the new technologies of publication and
communication have changed much of the playing field, I feel compelled to
reply to your question at some length. Later, I‘ll abbreviate my replies to
your following questions for the sake of balance.
To begin with your initial remark regarding ―the charges leveled
against‖ your editorial project, such charges seem to reflect what we may,
for convenience, call the ―gate-keepers‖ worry.1 I recall a conversation with
Larry Hatab in which he denounced the many publishing opportunities, as
he perceived them, that seemed to be springing up everywhere. At the time
(and now), I didn‘t see the explosion as being either all that explosive or
indeed as undesirable — so obviously we were on different sides on the
matter.
I held that we needed even more journals than we have. And in my
view, current journals, even new ones, tend to reproduce very standard
points of view, just with different names. I believe that one should have, just
as Nietzsche argues, as many viewpoints as possible. And yet I should
underline, and this is a more elusive point, I do not believe that we should
have only or just those viewpoints we regard as ―good.‖ I say this because
what we call ―good‖ is itself a judgment established on the basis of the
things we take ourselves to know. Another word for such judgments, as we
learn from hermeneutics, is prejudice.
Nietzsche had his own way of putting this as he foregrounds it at
the start of his The Gay Science, after his musical jokes (and here it matters
very much that we keep in mind, from a publishing perspective, which was
always of crucial interest to Nietzsche, that The Gay Science was a prelude
to his Zarathustra, itself a parodic or, again, playful prelude to his very
important and to date ill-understood, Beyond Good and Evil):
it has often seemed to me as if anyone calling for an
intellectual conscience were as lonely in the most densely
populated cities as if he were in a desert. Everyone looks at
you with strange eyes and goes right on handling his scales,
calling this good and that evil. Nobody even blushes when
you intimate that their weights are underweight; nor do
people feel outraged; they merely laugh at your doubts. (GS
§2)
Larry, who is of course an excellent Nietzschean in every other
sense, had his own good reasons for his concern. The gate-keeper‘s worry
reflects the confidence we have, and we academics do count on this
conviction for hiring and tenuring and so on, that so-called better or ―top
tier‖ journals — and we may extend this to our views of publishing houses
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or even of universities and so on — are indeed better than other journals
and publishing houses. And we hold that they are better (this is the point
David Hume tries to make in his On the Standard of Taste) in some sort of
objectively sanctioned fashion. It is essential to a conviction, in order for it
to be a conviction, that it remains unquestioned.
The notion of ―top-tier‖ corresponds to what the sociologist Pierre
Bourdieu called ―distinction‖ and such things are the most solid things we
have in our capitalist world: silk and cashmere are in truth more valuable
(more goes into their production) than, say, acrylic or polyester. Beyond the
stuff of stuff, beyond fabrics, a Rolls Royce, like a Bentley, is an excellent
car, but how much better than a Jaguar? Or to make it a harder question,
how much better than a Ferrari?—a Porsche? —a Mercedes Benz? —and so
on. The car industry happily provides exemplars to answer such questions
and much of what counts as excellence is perceived excellence. In addition,
when it comes to truly high-end automobiles, it is a buyer‟s market only,
and that means that most such questions hardly concern us as consumers,
as users, and to that extent our own experience of high-end ―excellence‖ in
the real world is a spectator‘s, an observer‘s, rather than a user‘s
experience. The ―goodness‖ of the Rolls Royce, for most of us, is to see it
driving past us if we are in downtown Beverly Hills or out in the Hamptons.
So too, and this is the value point of the cost issue, an Ivy League education
is similarly exclusive (ergo rarified) and excluding (and this is, the
economists tell us, how scarcity is manufactured).
Publications are different by nature. And desktop and online
publishing only make the issue more complex. Thus the anxiety about new
publications is related to anxiety about whether or not they have been
properly ‗vetted‘ and this in turn is really about another question: will these
new publications upset established apple carts? And so on. Nevertheless,
founding journals is something you have in common with a number of
illustrious forbears such as Friedrich Schiller and Friedrich Hölderlin.
At the start, one journal is no better and no worse than any other.
In fact, your greatest challenge is not so much the project you are beginning
but whether it can be kept: there are many journals that have appeared,
with ‗good‘ editors, and ‗good‘ contributors, only to vanish after a single
issue. Thus what makes a journal, beyond reader judgment (and on an
individual level that is always a matter of taste: what issue do you pick up?
which do you continue to read?), is the editors‘ vision. At the same time, it
depends even more on the authors who contribute, and yet more important
(and I would actually add layout to the mix) is the question of dissemination.
Dissemination is related to distribution, but in addition, and this is still
more elusive, there is the challenge of acquiring readers even given
distribution. Thus what makes a journal (or a press) top quality has to do
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with ―reception‖ and reception is tied to academic capital, again, in
Bourdieu‘s sense of the term. Publishers such as Harvard University Press,
Oxford University Press, Gallimard, Walter de Grutyer, have such capital.
At the same time, the paradox of academic capital is its utter
dreariness: the material such well-respected publishers publish is so very
standardized (as a matter of sheer conventionality) that one very soon
discovers that one is only reading the same old (or same young) folk talking
to (and about) the same old (or young) folk. This is, for example, a complaint
commonly uttered against the New York Review of Books just because the
New York Review of Books, like most review publications, does not exist in
order to, say, as one might innocently suppose, review books as such as
much as it exists to review just and only the kind of books its
editors/reviewers like — which almost always means only the kind of books
its editors/reviewers write. This is well before Eli Pariser and others wrote
about the Internet bubble, the academic bubble that used once to be called,
shades of Simeon Stylites, the ivory tower.
However, even as the inherent circularity, insularity, nepotism of
academic publishing can be deadly, at the same time (and this is also the
stuff of media studies, propaganda research, and the sociology of
advertising, this is the McLuhan effect), it‘s also the case that as a species
we crave repetition: repetition reinforces our beliefs and all of us are happy
to confirm our prejudices. This is how
What we don‘t like is for
the ‗bubble‘ (Google is calling this
people who rock the boat.
your ‗circles,‘ Facebook just filters
your buddies for you without giving
And when one starts a journal
the filter a name) works as a bubble.
one is inevitably rocking the
Leibniz liked the word monad, in this
boat, whether or not one
case,
to
push
the
metaphor,
windowless even with, just because
means to be.
of, windows and internet access.
As I see it, the charges leveled against you derive from this broader
circumstance. In general, what we don‘t like is for people who rock the boat.
And when one starts a journal, I would say, especially as an undergraduate,
one is inevitably rocking the boat, whether or not one means to be.
To turn to your question about the ―duty‖ of an editor, I should
qualify my views by emphasizing that I always also edit with the perspective
of an author in mind. For my own part, and I am also thinking historically
about what has been the case with regard to journals founded in the past
(here we are back to Schiller and Hölderlin, et al.), the role of an editor is
ultimately, and inevitably, to produce a whole. The editor qua editor edits a
journal or (a book collection), that is then published as an entirety: the
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journal is not this or that article, the book is not this or that chapter, it is
the book as a whole. It is this entirety that conveys the spirit of its editors,
its editorial board, and (this works backwards because this is also what
draws future contributions) its authors as well.
In this sense, the role of the editor is like a musical conductor‘s role,
whereby the role of the editor is to permit or allow a certain overarching,
unified voice or spirit to emerge. This spirit is already in evidence in what
makes a given issue of a journal to be a particular issue (sometimes this is
effected by nothing more than an ingenious title, sometimes it is evident in
reading a table of contents), and it is what makes a book collection to be a
book rather than a collocation of unrelated essays (this last question, when
it comes to collections, is something book publishers worry a good deal
about, although and in fact publishers tend to publish collections that are
timely even when they do not cohere).
At the same time, and I always find this surprising, not only do
authors rarely appreciate an editor‘s efforts, authors brought together in a
journal (or a book collection) tend not to read one another. This is relevant
because when one speaks of readers one automatically discounts the
authors themselves just as one discounts the editors and the reviewers and
conjures up, in the general fantasy that is publishing, a great mass of
readers: which mass is then reified as the ideal reader. But the one thing
that emerges from web 2.0 hype is that for the most part all of us exemplify
in the best and worst, i.e., most literal, way what Mark Twain once said (I
owe the reference to Tracy B. Strong): all of us have music and poetry inside
of us, but most have a hard time getting it out.
Well, Mark Twain, i.e, twice and again: it‘s not hard anymore. Thus
there‘s YouTube, there‘s Facebook, the rightly-named Twitter (proving, as if
it had needed to be shown, that deep or complex thoughts cannot be
expressed with brevity), and any number of other outlets. All ways, as I
argue elsewhere with respect to today‘s internet, that are surprisingly
similar to the activity of writing on a public bathroom wall, metaphorically
speaking . . . 2
Graffiti, Kilroy was here, or better words to that effect, is of course a
kind of publishing and in many ways it trumps Twitter and proves that, in
context and in the real world, far more can be done with far less.
Hence, when the Barnes and Noble store closed at the Lincoln
Center triangle of Broadway and Columbus Avenue, for a brief moment,
passersby would be able to see what had been written on the wall in the
universal idiom of spray paint, the medium and font of choice for urban
commentary: ―UNION JOB NOT‖ and all the despair of the current
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downsizing that is shattering the American nation and its dream is written
there.
The real world point here has to do with the writing one can read on
such a wall. In the case of a closing store, that inscription is soon painted
over or boarded up, but with a journal that can last in the case of a print
issue as long as the issue itself lasts, in libraries, stores (of course there are
fewer and fewer of these and that trend will only continue), personal
collections, and so on. What one encounters with a real print issue of a
journal is the whole journal; printed and bound, for any given issue of a
journal is effectively a book, and like a book collection, it is the editor, from
the point of view of the Library of Congress, who counts as the author. 3
By the same token, this experience of an encounter with a journal
(or a magazine) is changing with the atomizing effects of on-line publishing,
an atomization which extends the original insularity of the authors of the
articles themselves, as the authors of those articles (never mind the
intentions of the editor, and this is even the case with a commissioned book,
that is to say: even when an editor conceives the theme and invites
contributors to contribute) remain intrinsically isolated one from another.
Readers too relate to the text as such in an increasingly atomistic
fashion, and as Nietzsche once observed fairly disparagingly, one often reads
(just as one often stops reading altogether) only for the sake of a book of
one‘s own. But as I noted above, and as many commentators on the internet
or web have also noted, especially Jaron Lanier but also media theorists at
every level, there is a massive ―conversion‖ of consumers aka ―content users‖
who are now, willy-nilly, and merely by posting, merely by ‗sharing,‘ also
―publishing.‖ The point is an instructive one, and it would be great if
economists could learn a bit from it.
Those who produce are also those who consume. Note that this is
not new: it was always so. What is new is that it is now true for more and
more people. The writers in other words are the readers. This is literally so
in the case of a Twitter ‗retweet‘ which is simply a more redundant version of
a Facebook ‗like‘ — all of which are so many ways to advertise.
By contrast, of course, the old model of publishing assumes a set of
dynamics that have not changed since the means of the propagation of texts
in antiquity: there we are back to writing on the wall, with parallels to and
with proportionality that were themselves much older, drawn from public
spaces to the theater in the open air and from the specific acoustics of a
closed space, a cave, a tholos tomb (and we still see this in the lecture hall)
or, expanding the theater (and therewith the lecture hall), to a public rally in
the open air, where with the last we now assume loud speakers, as we must
do ever since Hitler made this problematic. As Rudolf Arnheim noted, among
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many others who have explored this, an understanding of this phenomena
must be extended ‗over the air‘ itself, across borders, with a study of radio
broadcast.4 Thus we cross the world, and today, given a network link,
wireless or not, publishing is broadcast on the internet, visually in every
graphic sense and acoustically. As the model goes: there is productive
content (whether online, on the radio, at the podium, on stage) and there is
a listening, receptive audience: ‗Hello world,‘ says the first time blogger.
The ideal is the theatre, which is very interesting as that goes back
to the dawn of democracy in antiquity, or the musical concert (which was in
antiquity the same as Nietzsche sought to remind us, not that those who
study him have managed to notice), and it continues to this day in a market
economy, which engenders the kind of entertainment that made the world ―a
stage‖ in the middle ages, because what one wants, after all, are paying
customers. It is the spectacle that sells, or better said, as Nietzsche also
shows to the frustration of his Zarathustra: it is a particular kind of
spectacle, in this case that would be the cruel prospect of the undoing of the
―overman‖ (the fall of the tightrope walker) that attracts people to the market
place to begin with.
This works with a medieval masque or fair, as this also works with a
travelling show, with today‘s music concerts, be they classical or not, or
when the circus comes to town (provided one does not think, as one ought
to think, about the cruelty to animals). For the terms of publishing today,
the trouble begins when it comes to understanding the new media.
And today, in point of fact, everyone pays. You get your internet
from somewhere; even if you don‘t personally pay AOL or Compuserve, you
do pay the phone company for DSL or you pay for cable or what have you.
Or if you use your university connection, you pay for that pretty directly
(even if the university, to confuse matters, sometimes calls these ‗indirect
costs‘). The problem when it comes to publishing, and it is this that gets
Lanier‘s goat, is that the same everyman (to use that metaphor as we may,
having introduced the medieval masque above) also produces or generates
their own experience.
Again: everyone pays but not everyone gets paid. And that last bit
continues to resist comprehension although it is the most obvious of all,
which was the point of Shakespeare‘s all the world‟s a stage, as I already
alluded to it, and the point your composition or journalism teacher tried to
drive home to you by suggesting you write, à la Kerouac, from ‗life.‘ If you
want to sing Karaoke fine, if you don‘t want to sing fine, you are still part of
the spectacle if you turn up for Karaoke Night at your local bar. And as
Lanier and others are at pains to explain, you are still part of the spectacle if
you skip the local bar and simply tune in to American Idol.
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Likewise, and because of its ubiquity, you are involved with
YouTube whatever you do. YouTube is a giant machine for ―free‖ content
supplied by both individuals and professional content makers. Content
drives a system that goes beyond content itself. Indeed, the content is
ultimately utterly irrelevant. It is there to occupy your mind, catch your
critical attention while the real work is worked upon you, that is to say, the
more interesting you, from the point of marketers, that is the uncritical and
more receptive you. This is true of the poem, as T. S. Eliot tells us, and it is
true of music and it is true of Google and Facebook ads, which is also how
and why Google and Facebook make the money they do make. You don‘t
think you pay attention to these ads but you do, and ten out of ten people
(ok: nine because I would certainly say Yes! let them be gone forever, if
anyone ever asked) say in fact, No: they would not want advertising banned
from television: they want ads on tv, on the radio, on the internet. Even
those who oppose ads, as in the case of the activist journal Adbusters,5
produce a product that is indistinguishable, and that is of course the
editor‘s point, from a journal full of ads.
The
problem
for
the
producers/consumers is that this content
production happens to be a one-way street,
as Lanier and others have observed. In
general, it does not lead to a book contract,
or a record contract, or a movie contract.
Most of my colleagues, especially those with
an interest in political philosophy, who
would like to have CNN, say, call them in as
―experts,‖ do not in fact get called. Most
bloggers will not be able to turn their blogs
into a book. (Sorry.) If you write a book
about your senior year and turn it into an
ebook, it may not get buyers; but then again
it might. Lanier worries that is an inevitably
one-off phenomenon, affected all the way down by a certain interplay (and
many of his critics fail to note this and simply counter that, after all, it
might happen again, not note that this is not how Lanier puts it, between
mimesis and projection/conjecture). The point is the old science fiction
paradox, which academics, from Žižek to me and many others, love to write
about by abbreviating the reference to the SF paradox to a mere mention of
the movie, Minority Report (though Twelve Monkeys is probably more to the
gut existential point), and Minority Report is in fact, and as Avatar was, a
kind of advance marketing for putatively future technologies (so far,
however, 3-D screens, for example, are not selling as well as had been
hoped).

Everyone pays but not
everyone gets paid…
And that last bit
continues to resist
comprehension although
it is the most obvious of
all. The problem for the
producers/consumers is
that content production
happens to be a oneway street.
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Beyond the monotony that is the inevitable consequence of this
phenomenon, the problem is the most pernicious for musicians. Indeed
musicians tend to get the short of end of the stick in all times. They were not
well served by the past system: the recording industry serves the recording
industry not the musicians, and radio serves the recording industry not the
musicians and not the listeners (what choice do you have, a question one
always ponders when one‘s local public broadcasting station hits one up for
bucks to support programming of a kind in which one as a member of the
public has in fact no say whatever). Thus as Lanier observes in his book,
you are not a gadget, the internet offers all kinds of possibilities, among
them musical, but almost none of them serve the working musician.6
In other words, as the saying goes, ‗Don‘t quit your day job.‘ In his
Against the Machine, Lee Siegel tries to track this from the start, going back,
as Lanier also goes back, to the now nearly romantically iconic WELL (but
this was also true of almost all of the old BBS and .alt communities, and
indeed every chat room, a certain vestige of which survives, albeit, one-onone in Facebook messages). For Siegel‘s point, as I would gloss it, trades on
the inherently economic equivocation built into the meaning of ‗exchange‘
per se: ―behind every intimate expression lay a self-advertisement; hidden in
the invitation to a relationship was the bid for a profitable connection.‖ 7
It‘s all about the sell, as Marschall McLuhan observed a long time
ago — which is why, although people periodically ―rediscover‖ him inside
and outside of the academy, McLuhan never left the advertising world. Not
for a single moment. Elvis may have left the building: McLuhan is always
with us.
Siegel too refers to McLuhan: he even includes a citation. Lanier
repeats the same point leaving out Siegel along with his references. This is
not a comment against Lanier, Siegel himself published his book apparently
after slashing his own references which live on as allusions, as echoes and
mentions which the majority of the readers one worries about, the readers
one supposes will be lost if one has too many (that would be any) footnotes,
can blissfully ignore: what you don‘t see won‘t bother you.
What concerns Siegel is the nature of the urge to turn one‘s private
experience into a public commodity, and Siegel‘s book is about the
eagerness of the public in general to do just that. To illustrate, consider New
York on New Year‘s Eve. The crowds who show up in Times Square do not
merely come to see the ball drop: they come decked out and fully hoping to
be seen seeing the ball drop.
This is not about expression: this about the media, i.e., this is a
reflection on publishing.
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Thus Siegel titles his central chapter, every allusion to McLuhan as
patent as you please, ―The Me is the Message.‖8 And the point is that exactly
this message is Madison Avenue‘s message: like the shirt or tie you plan to
buy: the savvy salesperson sidles up to you, murmuring, it‟s you, it‟s all you.
And we identify with this, a mirror of selling and sold, sold and selling. Thus
the other day at a camera store, a young man pointed to his glasses and
explained that this identified him as a PC, ‗You know,‘ he said to me
patiently, noticing my bewilderment: ‗like the commercial,‘ dutifully
deconstructing the point for my benefit: ‗Macs don‘t wear glasses.‘ I did not
buy the camera I came to buy.
Here the point is to become, and we are indeed to become, like the
himself,
the
products
we
tv–commercial-watching-young-salesman
‗consume.‘
For editors this is a conundrum, but it is also an opportunity and
others can tell you the opportunity. The conundrum is what interests me as
an editor and as a philosopher, for as an editor (and indeed, as an author)
what follows from this is that it is hard to count on readers. Hence, as
Derrida would say, ‗friends, there are no friends!,‘ here we may simply say:
‗readers, there are no readers!‘
To return to the heart of your question, when you ask about the
duty of the editor, the question is inevitably an ethical one. For my own part,
I follow what I take to be the editor‘s imperative. For me this is not about
serving a public, more or less imaginary as that public happens to be
imaginary in a Lacanian sense,9 but I take the role of an academic editor —
and I note of course that this will be different if one is editing items of public
or general interest — to be always to allow the author to speak.
From an editor‘s point of view, what this means in real effect is that
in academia as elsewhere, the editors, like the sound engineers in a music
concert or a music recording, are invisible. As a corollary, you should note
that editing will never do anything for you, neither for your ego nor for your
career. Editing will not get you into graduate studies; it will not get you a
job. In part this is a structural matter: the role of the editor is all about
bringing out, foregrounding, the work of others, sometimes this is by way of
direct editing, including direct cuts and glossing (this is hard because you
have to be able to judge what is meant and you have to be correct in that
judgment and every author, not only Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, claims to
mean what they do not in fact say, not because they are perverse but
because of the way language and context work in a text). In most cases in
the academic world, editing is simply a matter of recommending revision
(this lets the author say what they mean). Or the ultimate edit, which is of
course either publishing a text as is or refusing it.
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But at the end of the day, and this too is a corollary of editorial
invisibility, it remains the author, not the editor, who is responsible for what
is published under the author‘s name. When articles appear in print they do
not carry a little asterisk saying, ‗changed here and there by editorial fiat‘
although such changes can and do happen (my own titles have been
changed by editors, my texts have suffered awfully idiotic rephrasings and,
on the other side of the desk, for my own part and as an editor, to my pain,
if mostly for space reasons but sometimes for reasons of precision, I have
myself had to change the odd title or two).
At the same time, to go back to the idea of the supposedly undiluted
―rigor‖ of the profession, now to use the language of your critics, an editor‘s
judgment nearly always reflects, like the New York Review of Books already
mentioned, today‘s prevailing standards and these are not only all-toohuman but notoriously subject to change. And as standards they often fall
short of precisely what they claim to ensure as mentioned above:
distinguishing between good and bad work.
Here I find it salutary to reflect on the fact that Nietzsche‘s own
academic peers refused to recognize his work at all (never mind refusing to
name him as ―best‖ in his era). Nor has that changed in his field of classical
philology and that remains the case now after an interval of more than a
century.
Max Weber pointed to this as well – and although it always seemed
to me that Weber could have had Nietzsche in mind I believe he was
thinking (as authors often are) only about himself in fact. At the heart of
Weber‘s recommendation to anyone considering an academic life as a
vocation, be it as editor, or author, professor, researcher, no one ought to
consider academics (which he also called ―science,‖ using good German 19 th
century terminology as he happened to have done) if what one expects of it
is to be recognized for one‘s work. The unfairness of this lack of recognition
is the signal character of academia. It is also the prime reason for despair
and burn out among academics.
Weber‘s advice is empirically well-founded. Nor should one enter
into the life of a scholar, as an academic or a scientist of any kind, if one has
hope to be recognized thereby for talent, for achievement or for dedication.
Nor should one enter the life of academia if one hopes to find colleagues in
the true sense (ah, that would be others who share your interests). Weber‘s
reasons for saying this were empirical hence his advice is practical: so many
counsels of prudence, as Kant would say, and Thomas Kuhn would go on to
repeat them, with a good deal less verve, a little later. For us what follows
from this is that supposedly higher gatekeepers, the people one supposes to
be in control, the academic departments who make various appointments,
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especially at the level of distinguished chairs, the editors and the peer
reviewers who vet submitted essays, the publishers who publish, all do so
always according to their own reasons and ―excellence‖ is inevitably the least
of these.
The current worry in the peer-review process used in the natural
sciences in particular, and arguably this is most the important for a sciencefaithful public such as our own, concerns the nepotism or inherent
circularity of peer review. In fact, that is to say: in end effect, peer review
guarantees not objectivity but insularity. Like the New York Review of Each
Others Books, as it is sometimes called, the problem with ―peer review‖ in
the natural sciences is that it inevitably concentrates power (and grants) in
smaller and smaller circles of mutually reinforcing self-promotion.10 The
problem of industry supported research, namely that sponsored by big
tobacco and big pharma and so on, is only a more transparent and
manifestly more egregious variation on this. Science in general, and this is
the source of the influence of the sciences in the university, draws enormous
revenue (only museums and archaeological sites compare) from all kinds of
sponsors, the government included, and that sponsorship as Feyerabend
emphasized is by no means neutral.11
the problem with ―peer
Where power is conferred on a few hands,
one hand inevitably washes the other.
review‖ in the natural

sciences is that it
inevitably concentrates
power (and grants) in
smaller and smaller
circles of mutually
reinforcing selfpromotion. Where power
is conferred on a few
hands, one hand
inevitably washes the
other.

For
Weber,
and
speaking
practically, what this means for the student
is that if one wishes to choose the life of the
mind or the life of public service, that is
academia/science or politics as a vocation,
one is choosing science or politics as a
vocation, that is to say: as a way of life.
These then are recommendations for action,
so Weber counsels us. At the same time,
what people do in practice is not ideal. And
what one does in anything that one is called
to do, one does because one feels, for
whatever reason, and this will vary from
person to person, that it is worthwhile to do
(maybe it serves a personal ambition,
maybe everyone in one‘s family is also an academic, maybe one has nothing
better to do, etc.)
Your last question in this first series of questions is also, because it
is general, the most difficult. You ask: ―what is the value and the future of
academic publishing, both with periodicals as well as books?‖
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I think the most immediate value of specifically academic publishing
is that is about the ―life of the mind.‖ Publishing is its life‘s blood as it were,
and only through publishing can the ―life‖ of the life of the mind be assured
beyond individual scholarship itself (or Wissenschaft as both Goethe and
Kant and Nietzsche and Husserl and Heidegger spoke of it). This life is the
ultimate value of the real or actual production of books: by which I mean the
generation of the books themselves, the journals themselves, and that for
me is always all about ‗real‘ journals and ‗real‘ books — of the real-life kind,
on real paper.
Of course I realize I sound old-fashioned by talking about real books
and real paper. At the same time, the point I am hoping to make is a
physical, visceral, vital one. I would add along the way that the publication
of real journals, real books, already presupposes, as higher things tend to
do, the lesser coincident things as well, namely digital publication. Thus by
saying that publishing ought to be ―real,‖ I am hardly choosing against
virtual or online publication, PDFs or E-anything. Publishing a journal in
print form automatically generates the digital form (for we are not talking
about setting type as this Gutenberg-style legacy is a craft which is no
longer practiced and has thus become an ―art,‖ occasionally resuscitated
and meaning, to be sure, and I underline this: that much of what once
belonged to it qua craft is lost, perhaps irretrievably so as the things that are
the most crucial in any craft are always the things that go without saying
and are hence unrecorded12 — but what is certain, in any case, is that the
printer‘s skill in setting type is not used in today‘s academic publishing).13
I have already expressed my preference for print journals, but note
too, as far too few of us do — even on the level of theoretical reflection on
digital publication — that digital publishing as such is one of the most
evanescent, that also means the most fragile, invisibly so, of all publishing
forms. For this reason, real, physical journals; real, physical books, are
essential for enduring scholarship and preservation remains, given our
mortality and given our forgetfulness, the reason for scholarship as such.
At the same time as I would argue that there is no reason to choose
between ―real‖ and virtual publication, just such a choice happens (by
default) more and more. Excellent on this topic would be both the
aforementioned books by Lanier and by Siegel but also Cliff Stoll‘s Silicon
Snakeoil, which last includes an account of the mindless destruction of
information that was resultant not simply by destroying books as Google
has been and is doing (wholesale), but the things one never notices: the loss
of the accoutrements of past information technology, that would be
university library card catalogues, which contained, in their physicality,
corresponding in each case to their uniqueness to each institution,
inherently uncatalogued information added by the librarians (usually
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penciled in by hand, with soft, paper and revision friendly, lead),14 both in
user choices and through the unfortunate effects of decisions made by
librarians, which again reflect issues more of ideology than budgets. In
addition, and this matters in the context of periodical publication, when a
library cuts, as many libraries have cut, periodical subscriptions or book
orders, such cuts rarely translate to savings overall. Much rather, funds
spared in that way are usually spent in another way (this is a consequence
of working with ―budgets‖ of any kind but especially as institutionally
administered and one has recently been able to observe the terrible cost of
―budget thinking‖ during the debt ceiling debates which could only consider
certain — and never other — cuts).15
This Heidegger emphasizes, if it is also true that my old teacher Don
Ihde, despite his brilliance as an analyst of technology, manages because of
his own later focus on his own work (here Ihde is exactly like Heidegger who
was in turn exactly like Nietzsche) to miss the point of the point Heidegger
had been making with regard to both the printing press and the typewriter.
For his part, Ihde is only following Friedrich Kittler, but Kittler, who is
himself otherwise quite ingeniously brilliant, nevertheless, and like many
people in Germany (and elsewhere), seems apparently afflicted with the
desire to eschew Heidegger on principle (Sloterdijk is only somewhat of an
exception to this). Yet Heidegger, attuned as he was to the dynamic
evolution of technological artifacts, reminded us that ―the invention of the
printing press coincides with the inception of the modern period.‖16 To be
sure, Heidegger observes, this is the ―triumph of the machine,‖ but his point
is that it moves our relation to reading, to writing, away from a relation to
the word, to another way of forming the word. We no longer ―form‖ words
with a stylus in our hands, with a reed pen or an ink brush in this way.
Following the imprint of the printing press as the printer composed it,
thereby setting a page as a whole and at a blow, we are all become
typesetters, printer‘s assistants, ourselves: turned via the touch typing of a
Hemmingway towards the finger. Perhaps better said, we now key without
impact, we text: we have a fingertip relationship and increasingly less and
less of a haptic or tactile one to our keyboards, our blackberries, iPads:
soon, this is the point, again, about the pre-marketing marketing function of
Minority Report, we will soon write in the air (thus the future is a not a
personal jetpack or little spaceship, à la the Jetsons, but simply a business
woman, usually oriental, surrounded by technological displays and
competently conjuring an invisibly curved column of still more transparent
displays in the air around her, as seen in televison, internet, and magazine
advertisements, as these always reinforce one another), but we will not be
writing, and perhaps not even indicating, but something a bit closer to
‗completing‘/‘completed by‘ via the services of what we fairly revealingly call
a cloud which by then, of course, we will call something else.
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Academic study allows us to pay attention to things such as the
past relationship to the text as this informed what scholars of the past wrote
about, in some cases and here Foucault but also Pierre Hadot, Ivan Illich,17
and a range of authors following the Homer question and the use of new
technology (recording and computer analysis) have all of them helped us to
frame the question once again. As Hadot has taught us, what we take to be
straightforward theoretical texts were written therapeutically, that is to say
very literally for the sake of life, as practical aids to changing one‘s way of
living, rather than for the kind of speculative theoretical reflection that
appeals to us as children of the text and less and less of the book.
I hardly need to remind you that there are more publications now
than ever before. What is worth remembering as a scholar and a thinker is
that less is read than ever before. New authors should keep this in mind.
The sheer fact that you publish something does not entail that it is read.
Even if your blog has a respectable number of hits, it does not follow that
your blog has been read, and there is a similar caveat concerning the email
you may have received telling you that one of your articles has been
‗downloaded‘ so and so many times. In fact, the more articles one
downloads, the less, so I would hazard to say, one reads them.
As an illustration, consider the stunt at MIT recently used to
dramatize the inaccessibility of scientific articles to a reading public. 18 If we
bracket for the sake of argument (this is not a court of law) the closet Aaron
Swartz is said to have broken into, there are still a few hoops to jump
through, yet a few ―gates‖ to pass through. Access to MIT‘s library (access to
the ―Tool,‖ as MIT undergrads used to call their library when I was in
Boston/Cambridge) does not rank right up there with general access for
anyone. Just think how hard it is to get into your university library: what is
a mere annoyance for you in possession of an ID card turns out to be an
obstacle for anyone without one. My only point, the point worth thinking
about here is that accessing, downloading the articles, does not correlate to
articles actually read by the person who so assiduously downloaded them —
and of course Swartz very geekily did this, i.e., automatically, but to do so
requires a certain amount of gadgeteering which is why he needed to be in
an inaccessible place to begin with and indeed why he needed to be in the
particular place he was.
Increasingly, we are all such geeks, minus the latest or best
hardware and certainly minus the publicity plan. That is to say, to a greater
and greater degree, we tend to download on automatic pilot. The
determinism or autonomy of ―downloading‖ allows us to do this. I note as I
have already cited Stoll‘s point to this effect, that periodical reading rooms
are increasingly disappearing at university and college libraries across the
country. At my university, the entire periodicals room which had been
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architecturally designed into a library recently built at Fordham‘s Rose Hill
campus in the Bronx, featuring grand light for reading, was re-purposed
into a museum (rather like Stoll‘s dream of housing socks in old card
catalog drawers). Ironically and to be sure, the light, so excellent for reading,
cannot but be a liability for the artifacts housed there (even in their light
filtering display cases), and it is hoped that the curator eventually notices
this.
At the same time, and this attests to the continuity between
technologies of one kind or another, one always ran out of time in old
fashioned reading rooms which means that one always anticipated running
out of time, in advance of time. Thus if one could not make copies
automatically, one spent one‘s archival time, Nietzsche did this, I myself did
this in reading rooms where photo-copying was prohibited, taking manual
notes, with the mind to reconstruct later. The entire industry of ―Nietzsche
philology,‖ i.e., source scholarship, is thus concerned not with the
philological issues of interest to Nietzsche himself but and much rather with
the inevitably positivist and inevitably limited minutiae of sifting out what
Nietzsche thought all by himself, as it were, from what Nietzsche took or
derived from others. The very obvious fact that the two bleed into one
another in the life of the mind only compounds the philosophic limits of this
kind of work.19
If the technology at one‘s disposal is a real-live reading room, with
real-live limited hours but featuring copy machines, we anticipate the
consequences of limited time and proceed to subvert the same. This kind of
subversion however is conformity, determinism. We tailor our behaviour to
the fact that there are, as the T shirt goes, so many books, so little time.
Thus we spend our time copying the journal for an article to read ―later.‖20
I have binder volumes of articles I copied years ago just for this
purpose, and I have in fact read many of them (because I am keen on
reading). But I would also argue that the reason I have read many of them is
the fact that I happened to have a real photocopy that I could read later the
same day or happen across so many years later, be it serendipitously or
deliberately. Today, what makes the PDF phenomenon so intriguing for
philosophical reflection is the fact that when one has a PDF one does not
have a real ―copy.‖ One scans a text, even better one downloads it from
JSTOR. With that virtual advance, there is no need to actually read the text
or (recalling the digital activism of Swartz‘s automatic downloading stunt)
have any contact whatever with the text at all. As an author, you may still
get a note that your article has been downloaded so and so many times, but
this does not mean that anyone has read it.
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In fact, most articles, most books, have very few readers and among
those readers, so I would say (but this is the professor in me talking), very
few can be said to have really read the text. I have a German friend, the best
of my best friends, who vigorously denies having read books I know he has
read because I have seen him reading them with my own eyes and because I
know the marginal marks he makes (he has left many of these in my own
books). Now he happens to be a Suabian, and Nietzsche says that Suabians
simply like to lie, but in his defense, it matters that his father was a
classical philologist and it matters that he himself was a student of modern
philology, a rigorous training which meant, as it took me years to realize,
that he would refuse to say that he had read something until he had really,
really read it.
Nor was he wrong in so stylizing what counts as reading for this is
the very kind of reading an editor or an author hopes for.
When it comes to PDF‘s, Jaron Lanier has pointed out that the hit
phenomenon has the effect it has on us because we have adapted ourselves
to the structural design he names the UNIX legacy. This is the effective
absence of time as part of the command line interface. We count on this
absence (this is how we adapt to it/subvert it to use the sociologist‘s
language) when we text during down moments (as my students do this in
elevators, they also do this in class). But when we send them we know that
we are not dealing with the infinitely timeless patience of the machine
command line: we are no longer out of time, as it were. Once sent, the
message enters the real time that it takes for a text message to arrive at its
destination, for with texting as with email or a Facebook or blog post or a
tweet, we assume that arrival to be instantaneous. This we parse in human
time and hence we expect an immediate response the minute we send it. In
this way we negotiate the difference between lived or real or human time and
the timeless time of the command line (that is, until we hit return or ―send‖
which is another name for return and we should note that the metaphor in
question has already lodged itself in our consciousness). The immediacy of
email or texting, which is between writing for the long term, parallels,
although it is to be sure not the same as, immediate, face-to-face
communication as Ihde very insightfully analysed this last and newer
scholars would do well to explore this. (Note for instance that Facetime or
Skyping is inherently difference from meeting in person, however much the
software purveyors and your own increasingly busy life work to persuade
you to think otherwise).
There are all kinds of problems here (of course, what is at stake is
nothing but a version of the Turing test), but the only issue that is currently
thought to matter in a cash culture such as ours is whether or not you
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yourself or a machine has submitted an order form for a purchase or for
some other purpose, signed an online petition, and so on.
The Turing dimensionality of the test in question moves beyond or
outside of the command line interface because it cannot do otherwise if it
wishes to function as a test. What is problematic is that, and because it has
to produce feedback of a digital kind, it is a matter of translation.
Google wants the data for scanning purposes and otherwise, this we
know, or should if we were consciously noticing the ads (we do notice
subliminally/peripherally). Thus to prove that we are the one placing an
order or whatever, one is given a squiggled text or garbled text of the kind
that can nevertheless be read (eventually, and this is the fatality of this
process, because Google wants the data, in a fairly short term, this test will
no longer be able to function as a test), but it functions for now and one
types in the so-called ―captcha‖ and one is good to go.21
If our relation to the text has moved from the hand holding a stylus
or a quill pen of the kind Nietzsche still used before his very temporary
foray, encouraged by his illness and his myopia, to the use of typewriter, to
the typewriter/keyboard/keypad, using the tips or pads of our fingers. As
typewriters change (Nietzsche‘s typewriter was actually better than the
typewriters we know from our parents, just in terms of precision/speed), so
too texting, now ‗aided‘ with helpful machine completions (younger people
learn to accommodate this telegraphy, and accommodate one must in order
to use it), because as Heidegger also reminds us, the machine, be it old or
new, the technology (or the technique as Ellul would say) ―imposes its
use.‖22

In A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy,
you claimed that analytic philosophy

―. . . stands to science as scholastic philosophy once did to
theology. Continental philosophy differs from analytic
philosophy in its openness to questioning which also
means that it is less concerned with solutions than it is with
critical questioning (including the question of its own
presumptions or prejudices). But this focus on critical
questioning also means, at least ideally, that continental
philosophy does not aspire to take its rational warrant from
science itself.‖
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Nearly a decade on, there remains heated discussion about this
„analytic/continental divide.‟ What is the usefulness of this term and its
possible future?

The ―heatedness‖ of the discussion in question is mostly, so far as I can tell,
a matter of denouncing the ―significance‖ of the distinction altogether and
thus ultimately tending to deny its very existence. Your question regarding
the ―usefulness of this term‖ seems to point in this way for it seems to be
most ―useful‖ in order to pretend (here the Brian Leiter-report and
associated blogs are good instantiations of this particular ―use‖ or desire as
nerdish wish fulfillment) that scholars such as those whose work one does
not like can be not merely ignored, this is the ostrich effect, but and
ultimately ―designated‖ out of existence. And this sort of thing is quite old
hat in academia, which has always been a competitive arena (going as far
back as Heraclitus who recommended junking everyone else but himself).
It‘s also emblematic of the modern, thus we hear the trope at the
penultimate level of Nietzsche‘s short ―History of an Error,‖ which is more
about the natural history of errancy and illusion than an account of the
difference between the ―real‖ world (which originally of course meant the
ideal world) and the apparent or phenomenal world when he writes:
—an idea no longer of any use . . . — an idea grown useless,
superfluous, consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish it!
(Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, How the Real World at Last
Became a Myth)
It goes without saying that abolishing ―an idea grown useless‖ is
inherently risky not for reasons of, say, reverential regard but because the
supererogatory is not therefore or thereby ―refuted.‖ Occam‘s razor is a
principle of convenience, not demonstration, and it is not a matter of
ontology. In the case of Nietzsche‘s particular example, if we proceed to
abolish the so-called ―real world‖ we will find that ―we have also abolished
the apparent world (Ibid.).‖ The case of the real/apparent world is a case of
co-relevant concepts. Nietzsche‘s joke is in the rhetorical array: it‘s because
the idea may be said to be ―useless,‖ one supposes one may do away with it:
because it is ―superfluous,‖ one concludes that it has been, as a result,
―refuted.‖
Why not get rid of it?
More than one person23 has told me that that one of the more
compelling points in my article, as you quote it, from Carlos Prado‘s book
collection, A House Divided,24 is that I highlight the closed-off character of
analytic style philosophy. Thus contemporary analytic philosophy is not
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open to questioning, and it is not closed because I say so but on its own
terms. Thus I describe traditional continental philosophy in its critically
hermeneutic and reflectively phenomenological character as the practice of
intensifying questions. I contrast this with analytic philosophy‘s ongoing
passion for deflating, puncturing, or otherwise dissolving questions, here,
again, just to use the rhetoric of the mainstream. It is a common place in
analytic philosophy to dismiss questions as such, i.e., ―unmasking‖ them as
not (really) ―real‖ questions, declaring them pseudo-questions. In this sense,
analytic or mainstream philosophy regards its task as the solving of
problems (to this extent, analytic philosophy follows Karl Popper), dissolving
all other problems and issues as irrelevant or unreal, as pseudo-problems.
I should say that in the same way that continental philosophy
describes a philosophical style and is thus otherwise than a description of
philosophy as currently practiced on the continent, 25 analytic philosophy
which is otherwise called ―mainstream‖ or received philosophy, is itself and
likewise a style, referring to more than one kind and is thus not only a
single or specific method or locus.
In the case of continental philosophy, we do not ask which of the
world‘s continents counts as the locus of continental philosophy. The
referent, as we know, betrays the Anglo-Saxon, British origins of the
distinction as such. Hence talk of European philosophy hardly settles the
question as some have sought to settle it, nor is the issue resolved by
arguing that there is no difference to speak of because analytic philosophy is
now dominant the world over.
Again, and in place of analytic problem solving, I highlight
traditional continental philosophy‘s willingness to pose questions and to
hold with them as such, as I take Heidegger and Nietzsche as prime
exemplifications of this willingness to question and even, and as I have
sought to do in my own work, to render what is questionable or problematic
even more problematic.
Where one asks whether it is ‗useful‘ to distinguish between
maintaining and dissolving problems, perhaps simply by stipulating them as
solved or else by declaring them useless or meaningless, as so many
distinctions to be ―abolished,‖ one still means thereby to eliminate what is
problematic and as a consequence one gets to dismiss those who present or
maintain such problems. This is what makes the focus on what may be
designated as ‗useful‘ or ‗efficient,‘ an expeditious one. This is done by the
difference quashing power of the first person plural. Hence, one says: ―we‖
don‘t need to talk about continental and analytic philosophy any longer,
―we‖ don‘t find the distinction ―useful.‖ But such a way of speaking has its
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own utility and the result of that is a patently monolithic conception of
philosophy.
My worry in response to this has always been, firstly, that
philosophy is and has always been all about making distinctions. 26 ―I‘ll
teach you differences,‖ says Wittgenstein, himself quoting Shakespeare in
his turn. Secondly, as just noted, I am struck by how self-serving such
claims have tended to be for certain elements of the academy. When I first
wrote this essay in 1991, twenty years ago, I noticed that when authors
claimed as they did in book after book on the post this or post that ―turn‖ in
analytic philosophy, authors tended to declare how very advanced analytic
philosophy was, how open-minded it was, and so on but all such books
tended almost without exception to use such claims as the basis for
excluding or limiting rather than encouraging dialogue, conversation,
exchange.
If one wanted to talk about Husserl and Heisenberg in the
philosophy of science, as one of my teachers did, or about Nietzsche and
about Heidegger as I did, one met closed doors, there was and is no
dialogue, no conversation, certainly no exchange. And when it comes to the
profession, simple non-mention, utter exclusion turns out to be far more
efficient than refutation.
It does not seem to me that claiming that the distinction isn‘t
‗useful‘ or that it is ‗meaningless‘ is terrifically different.
The purpose to be served is exclusion.
We all already know all that, say the powers that be, but analytic
philosophy isn‟t that way at all, it has changed, analytic philosophy is now so
various and so new, hence it is, as my colleagues at Fordham will tell me,
that there are so many different kinds of philosophy of mind and analytic
metaphysics and so on, the logic of which adverting to such proliferation of
kinds and kinds translates in effect to saying: don‟t talk to us about your
concerns, about the kinds of things you do, we‟re not interested, we don‟t
want to hear from you, we don‟t want to hear from those like you, we already
know what you have to say. And besides: we don‟t „understand it.‟ Instead of
engaging in dialogue, instead of talking about what has been done in your
tradition and what your current concerns are, what you ought to do is listen to
us. Rather than exchange and conversation: it is just and only analytic
philosophy that should be read, you should hire scholars trained in analytic
philosophy who do so-called „continental‟ work, you ought to dialogue with
analytic philosophers only, converse solely on our topics, using only our
terminology.
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It seemed to me then and it still seems to me that this only serves
the purpose of enshrining one particular style of doing philosophy as the
only style of philosophy. And this is the effect whenever one says, as many
younger scholars who also and despite an analytic formation describe
themselves as continental (in good analytic fashion, let it be noted), let‘s not
perpetuate such distinctions, but let‘s talk instead of ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘
philosophy. But what counts as good and what counts as bad always turn
to be kinds of philosophy that exemplify that same analytic formation.
I will hold off discussing the last issue you raise in your question for
my reply to the following question as it bears on the issue of science (in
place of theology).

Much of your work has focused on Nietzsche‟s relationship to science.
What is the significance of Nietzsche, a figure predominantly read in
the humanities, to a philosophy of science and to practical scientific
endeavors?
I hold that Nietzsche matters for anyone who wants to think
philosophically, i.e., critically about science.27 I say this because Nietzsche
undertakes to question science purely philosophically by raising the
question of science as a question and as such. This is the question
Nietzsche poses in a preface added to his first book in the wake of his
experience of being misunderstood by his peers with respect to his project
there (as scholars continue to fail to understand it). That book, The Birth of
Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music, hardly seems, as you correctly point out,
to be a book about science as such or at all and certainly it seems irrelevant
to the so-called hard sciences.
Nietzsche‘s first book, the book he says is all about this very
question of science, thus seems to be very much concerned with what you
call the humanities, that aesthetic philosophy, historical questions of poetry
and theatre and literature and music as well as political culture. Yet it is
exactly with reference to this book that Nietzsche claims that he is the first
to raise the question of science as a question. Most scholars simply dismiss
this claim. I take it seriously and when one does that and when does so in a
sustained fashion, one sees that Nietzsche‘s book is a genuinely,
methodologically scientific undertaking just where Nietzsche qua classical
philologist seeks to understand the genesis of the tragic work of art as the
title of the book tells us that he does, out of the sounding, i.e., out of the
spirit of ancient Greek (as this was, so Nietzsche had discovered, an
explicitly, literally musical voicing).28 The ―science‖ in question, disciplinarily
speaking, was Nietzsche‘s own discipline of classical philology,
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methodologically articulated in accordance with the procedure of ‗any
science whatever‘ as this was supposed possible in the 19 th century and
Nietzsche did suppose this, following Kant, and the very specific
understanding of the nature of lyric poetry in the tragic, musical work of art,
in terms of the function of the chorus, and the entirety of the tragic artwork
in terms of the role of culture as a whole in the same tragic era of ancient
Greece, just and precisely because that era comes to an end, as Nietzsche
argues in his first book, with the tragedies of Euripides (and coincidentally
with Plato/Socrates).
Note that what we name tragedy today, what Shakespeare called
tragedy, what Walter Benjamin called tragedy, has in consequence nothing
to do with the historical focus of Nietzsche‘s book and only thus can one
understand why he speaks of the possibility of a rebirth of tragic culture
(and his appeal to Wagner and his followers to support his cause).
With Nietzsche‘s claim that he is the first to raise the question of
science as such, as we have already noted this above, he takes science
methodologically and as I show elsewhere, citing Karl Jaspers, this
emphasis on method was no kind of conceit: many scientists, including
students of medicine and physiology, turned to philology just to learn the
rigors of method. Nor was it an accident that Darwin himself turned to the
linguistic schema that was the legacy of the very same Alexandrian
grammarians that Nietzsche speaks of in order to borrow the differential
relations between the evolutionary development of language to pattern his
own theory of the origin of species. And what Nietzsche means (and we recall
that he recommends that one question grammar itself) is thus that he is the
first to put the presuppositions of science itself in question, as this of course
corresponds to the very Kantian question of putting science itself on the
path, as it were, of a science.
Nietzsche also raises the related question of truth, he questions
causality as well as our presuppositions about it, and he goes on to frame or
raise the question of the origin of logic itself in very logical and historical
terms, again and in every case logically or scientifically (and in the case of
the last he reminds us of the oddity of our universal conviction that we can
proceed from non-knowledge to knowledge, transition from error to truth,
and in general and thereby manage to advance from mythic thought and
convention to logical and rational thinking). How, Nietzsche asks, does that
work? How is it possible to begin with error and proceed to truth? If we
begin with superstition and ignorance, exactly how do we attain
enlightenment and knowledge? Everything depends upon the question of
foundation or ground and Nietzsche‘s question asks the ultimate question of
ground.
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As I have pointed out throughout my career, these are logical
questions. Logic conserves or preserves what truth one has to begin with.
Reasoning logically, we do not deviate from correct insights, whereas illogical
process leaves any and everywhere, even when our premises are true.
The problem for Nietzsche (and Heidegger), as for Kant, Hume,
Descartes, is to find a secure foundation.
Today we no longer worry about such questions because we take
science as our foundation, as our point of departure. Hence, we take ‗as
true‘ what science says is true. And maybe it is, but philosophy does not
raise critical questions.
Here I return to the parallel you cited above in your previous
question on the analytic/continental divide, where scholastic philosophy
once served theology and where theology indeed and very conscientiously,
even anxiously required its services (even if this anxiety tended to lead to an
ultimate movement to ―deny reason‖ in order, as it were, to make room ―for
faith‖), today‘s science is not in need of philosophy‘s contributions be they
analytic or continental. Just this sovereignty on the part of modern science
is problematic for the dominant mode of philosophizing, that is, analytic
philosophy, to the extent that it embraces (as traditional philosophy never
for its part ‗embraced‘ theology, per impossibile, in the case of Aristotle)
science as its model, or ideal.
In other words, analytic philosophy embraces an enterprise, the
natural sciences, that has no need of its services.
Such an embrace does not characterize the critical, continental kind
of philosophy of science, like Nietzsche‘s, as I have argued, that does not
model itself on science and does not aspire to be taken ―as‖ science
whenever that might be possible but instead and much rather puts science
itself in question. In this way, although analytic philosophy emphasizes
what is called ‗critical thinking,‘ there is in fact a radical avoidance of
critique especially where it concerns science, and I have always found this
problematic for the philosophy of science. I have some small comfort, though
it may not comfort him to have me cite him here, but the perfectly analytic
P.M.S. Hacker makes a similar point.29
Now to say that analytic-style philosophy radically avoids critique
when it comes to science is hardly to say that there is a lack of critical
terminology in analytic philosophy, and it doesn‘t mean that analytic
philosophers aren‘t nasty about this or that. Indeed, from the point of
feminist and other perspectives in the academy, speaking more universally,
one of the more problematic characteristics of mainstream philosophy is
that analytic philosophy features a style and modality that is one of the
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nastier styles to be found in the academy as a whole, specifically when it
comes to friendliness towards women in philosophy, 30 which thus extends,
as I have argued in another context, toward other reflective styles or ways of
doing philosophy such as the continental modalities we were discussing
above.
If analytic philosophy does not question science, science in turn, as
I have noted, does not for its part regard philosophy, no matter whether
analytic or continental, as theology once regarded philosophy. Thus it is not
the case that science gives a hoot about the distinctions between
philosophical kinds that I am making here. Hence I have always found it
worth reflecting that when it comes to the relevance of the philosophy of
science of any flavor (analytic or continental), for ―practical scientific
endeavors,‖ to use your terminology to refer to the work of contemporary
scientists, science itself happily proceeds without referring to philosophy at
all. Thus although traditional philosophers of science may regard what they
write upon as having more significance to practical scientific endeavors (as
opposed, say, to Nietzsche‘s philosophy of science), the scientists themselves
do not depend upon philosophy of any kind and are, it would appear,
universally united in not taking it to be particularly significant for their own
practice.
And indeed that has always been true. If Quine could say that
mathematics is philosophy enough, the physicists, and this is why Nietzsche
addresses himself directly to the physicists (―my dear Messieurs Physicist,‖
he writes), might counter that physics is philosophy enough. If yesterday‘s
scientist, scientists like Heisenberg and Einstein and Schrödinger, enjoyed a
background that included philosophy in addition to classical studies, that
did not mean that they revered the philosophers of science of their day. They
always held themselves perfectly capable of philosophizing all by themselves
— and many did. They did not need to and they did not appeal to their
colleagues in philosophy to help them out.
Let me note further that analytic philosophy, especially analytic
philosophy of science, especially the cognitive sciences, are not at all
sanguine about this state of affairs and they often undertake to do whatever
they can to get scientists to pay attention to them. Hence it is precisely
analytic philosophy — and precisely to the extent that it very deliberately
patterns itself on science — that is concerned to persuade science to take its
efforts seriously, to find its efforts useful, and so on. This may well be
behind the recent turn to empirical philosophy, which is philosophy by
survey, an amusing ennobling of the appeal that is called the argumentum
ad populum (and which used once upon a time to be regarded as a textbook
fallacy).31 I note in passing however that this changes little with regard to
the point I am making here, inasmuch as this turn will at best make of
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philosophy a social science, which social sciences have their own anxieties
about presenting themselves to the natural sciences as sciences. In place of
19th century method, we have 20 th (and so far or to date 21 st) century
quantificational analysis.
I don‘t think analytic philosophers have had much success
persuading the scientists per se that they need analytic philosophy. Analytic
philosophers, claiming to speak for the scientists, do however have success
in persuading university deans that they in fact represent the sciences
although I don‘t know how long this will last. I have often thought that if
there are, as indeed there are, many universities that host Departments of
Cognitive Science along with Departments of Linguistics and Departments of
Neuroscience as well as Departments of Cognitive Pyschology, Information
Science, Robotics, and so on, that a Department of Philosophy taken as
translator of the sciences to the sciences,
Perhaps it might be
might well seem to be redundant or
unnecessary, assuming, as I assume, a
useful to replace
competent faculty in the aforenamed
departments of analytic
disciplines, all of whom can teach what
philosophy…with real
analytic philosophers regard as ‗critical
thinking,‘ and all of whom know the
science studies
sciences to which analytic philosophers
programs that would
appeal (say, regarding brain states) far
teach stock or standard
better than the philosophers themselves.

accounts of the aims of
science to the general
public, i.e., science
literacy.

Unlike theology that conscientiously
drew upon philosophy, science faculty are
well able to explain their own ways to
themselves and to students and others and
do not need such handmaidens or (ancillae).

Perhaps it might be useful be to replace departments of analytic
philosophy, dedicated as many are today to a kind of simplified science
literacy (and not the critical analysis of science, as that last has died the
death of the so-called strong program of the sociology of science and the
evaporation of the anthropology of science into actor network analysis), and
to the celebration of what it takes to be the content of science, with real
science studies programs that would teach stock or standard accounts of
the aims of science to the general public, i.e., science literacy.
This is not the same for continental philosophy which for the most
part, and because it is less and less what it used to be and more and more
what analytic philosophy has left over for it to be, dutifully avoids reflection
on science like the plague. This is not the case for continental philosophy of
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science but, as if I needed to emphasize this once again, that is a very small
subfield.

As someone who has spent considerable time working abroad, what
are the primary differences among university systems in the United
States and in the countries of Europe, and how do those differences
bear on the way philosophy is regarded in these places?
European universities have the great luxury of drawing upon students who
have been trained at the level attained by secondary education in Europe,
which is actually, although Americans rightly hate it when I say this — I
lament that I have to say this — breathtaking by comparison with an
American high school education, even a private high school or prep school
education.
By the time European students get to university they know
languages (and American students tend not to learn languages at all, not
even when they are doctoral students), they‘ve read texts. Most importantly,
perhaps, they have learned how to read those texts, which is something that
American students do not do perhaps for the simple reason that like high
school teachers, professors in the US teach out of fragments of texts or bits
of books. In other words, most US philosophy professors use textbooks and
self-made textbooks (those would be course packs) and draw on examples or
case studies rather than reading what they call the ―history‖ of philosophy,
and so on.
In addition and related to this, European students have also grown
up in a culture of the same bookish and musical sort. In other words, there
is a general regard for knowledge and for training, and especially for
philosophy (that does not mean analytic philosophy as it currently conceives
itself but it does mean philosophy as it has been historically and
traditionally conceived). In the US, many people have little understanding of
the meaning of philosophy and this circumstance has worsened in my
judgment as today even educated people in the US assume that ‗philosophy‘
is exactly (and only) what the analysts say it is.32
I am reminded here of Theodor Adorno‘s wry reflection that one of
the things that he learnt for the first time during his sojourn in America was
just how unimportant, how non-influential the so-called ―life of the mind‖ or
the intellect, could manage to be for a society as a whole.33 What Adorno
realized, this was the culture shock of the man who went on, on the basis of
this shock to write about what he thus called the ―culture industry‖ for the
rest of his life, was that what immediately enjoyed respect in Germany, what
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seemingly went without saying in Europe, counted for little or nothing in the
United States. This is an acknowledgment, on the one hand, of the freedom
of the American spirit,34 but and because this is Adorno speaking (who
immediately and rudely connects this with what he also calls the least
common denominator of intellectual capacity), it is also and on the other
hand, a sobering point, and rather than bristle at the very idea, we should
feel chastened by it.
As a corollary, and in fact, when we go abroad we are often delighted
by the opposite circumstance as it holds in Europe, whereby, metaphorically
speaking, we all become so many Neg-Adorno particles, (not that so very
many of us can afford to travel in Europe any longer). What is telling here is
that if you wander about the US and tell folks on your travels that you are
studying philosophy you can expect to meet a certain amount of
incomprehension and even more indifference. By contrast, your expressions
of philosophical interests will likely meet comprehension and respect and
may even lead to valuable discussions in Europe. Thus I routinely hear from
students who study abroad both astonishment at just how much they find
their foreign peers to ―know,‖ in the sense of sheer knowledge and depth of
knowledge, and regarding how much these peers ‗value‘ and enjoy learning
and knowing.
In sum, the primary difference
between
studying
philosophy
in
Europe and studying philosophy in the
US is that in the US we have neither
the luxury of the level of pre-university
preparation nor the overall breadth of
European culture in its both its
sensibility and its diversity. For many
(of course not all, but many) US college
students the first time they begin to do
serious academic work is when they
first arrive at university. But I think
the moral of the story here, is that one simply seek to find some time to
study abroad. And youth is for such journeys of broadening discovery.

The primary difference
between studying philosophy
in Europe and studying
philosophy in the US is that in
the US we have neither the
luxury of the level of preuniversity preparation nor the
overall breadth of European
culture…

Let me note, however, that the system there is changing and it does
seem as if Europe is collectively attempting its mighty best to become as
Americanized as possible (though one wonders whether the current
economic disaster on both the American and the European side may change
that trend), but there are still books to be read, journals to be read, the
encounter with other academic institutions and the traditions of the same
and despite recent changes, there remains (largely due to the secondary
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system, which if thinned or abbreviated is still impressive) a tradition or
culture of learning that is still well worth learning.
But if that is not enough for you, I have always maintained that the
only reason one ever has or will need to travel to Paris, for example, is the
simple promise of a cup of coffee. Just a cup of coffee: just sitting in a café
or standing at the bar. But once you get there, you might as well take a walk
along the Seine, and that means books and books and books again.

Mario Bunge, one of the many authors thinking about the „crisis of
philosophy,‟ wrote in Philosophy in Crisis: The Need for
Reconstruction that “all the philosophical schools are in ruins.” What
are your thoughts on Bunge‟s claim, and what are the political and
philosophical ramifications of the dialog of „crisis‟?
Here, I agree with Bunge, although and of course he is writing from the
analytic side in the philosophy of science and I too believe that things are as
bad from his point of view as they are from mine. On the other hand, we do
not of course agree as Bunge is strongly anti-hermeneutic.
For my own part, agreeing as I do agree that ―all‖ the schools of
philosophy are in ―ruins,‖ I also hold little hope that it is possible to
reconstruct or rebuild or start anew. Once one loses the teachers (and we
have lost them, not all but most), it is not just hard, it is impossible to
proceed with what deserves the name of philosophy. At the same time as I
say this, even if I mean only to say that most of the great minds are lost and
because those who take their place are not, just to say this politely, as great,
it is of course true that we still have to proceed as best we can.
The trouble as I see it is that those who now occupy positions of
prestige (here we are back to our original reference to standards and the
‗rigor‘ of the profession) are as newer scholars also are as mediocre as they
tend to be. For me, that only means that they are poorly trained and ill read,
and these, my younger colleagues, become angry examples of what
Nietzsche called Ressentiment if this is suggested, and I do suggest it.
If you want to know if this description of being poorly trained and ill
read applies to your professors, look around their house: how many books
do they have? I exclude the books in one‘s office as these, very physically,
very literally, are not the books one lives with.
Such bookish standards are all about what is meant when one talks
about formation as the French speak of it and Bildung as the Germans
speak of it. This is what Nietzsche meant when he talked about getting
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oneself an ―educator,‖ which is to say, doing what it takes (that means
reading and more reading) to acquire an ―education‖ or a ―culture,‖ and it
should go without saying that Nietzsche‘s standards were much higher than
mine could possibly be, just given my own inevitable limitations. This is
what Isaac Newton also meant when he talked about the giants of a past
intellectual formation.35 It is simply mind-blowing what people once knew.
I would point out that, and I blame myself as well, although I did my
damndest, albeit without success, that it is today‘s professors who have
presided over the current state of the profession. Bunge himself is to blame;
I am to blame. Of course Bunge has had vastly more power and influence
than I have had (this is easy to claim because I have had almost no
influence), and his failures are for those reasons far more significant than
mine just because I am not as important as he is.
Let me put this in another manner: there is no doubt in my mind
that Bunge has read not a word written by continental philosophers of
science and certainly not a word I have written. 36 By contrast I have, of
course (of course I say: of course) read Bunge (and many, many others).
Analytic philosophers of science take themselves to be reading continental
philosophy of science if they read Foucault — just as analytic philosophers
take themselves to be continental if they read, say Heidegger or Nietzsche.
What they do not do is read those continental authors or even many analytic
authors who write on Foucault, Heidegger, Nietzsche. And yet by
discounting the broader array of philosophy and philosophical authors and
commentators, analytic philosophy has painted itself into its own smaller
and smaller corner.
What is most regrettable perhaps is that at this point there seems to
be no robust alternative. Thus it is that today in most departments of
philosophy there is no other style of philosophy than the analytic kind.
Analytic philosophy has had the power in the academy (and it takes the
power because it is a tradition of entitlement and not mutuality) and the
result of its dominion (and it has and still has dominion) has been an
impoverishment of philosophy.
I will say that had the only kind of philosophy being taught when I
was a student been philosophy of what is today the analytic or mainstream
variety, not only would I not have been able to become what I am but I
would not have bothered in the first or last place.37 Life, after all, is short.

As a professor of philosophy in the academy, we presume your
responsibilities include research and publication and the education
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and mentoring of students. How are these responsibilities related? Do
students benefit from faculty research? How do these academic
responsibilities relate to the work of the philosopher, per se? Does it
make any sense today to speak of the non-academic philosopher?
Let me answer this, your last question, by starting with the last part of your
question. I don‘t believe there are really many non-academic philosophers,
unless they are independently wealthy. The Spinozas and the
Schopenhauers have always been in short supply.
But that said, the comparison is misleading. The simple fact that
one does not have an academic appointment is itself irrelevant to one‘s
academic qualifications or what I was above calling a formation. Both
Spinoza and Schopenhauer were academically extraordinarily well qualified.
So I would need more clarification with regard to your last question to be
able to speak of it. Do you mean, for example, is one able to be a
philosopher with no academic background whatever? I am not sure. Can
one think thoughts that might interest one and perhaps be of interest to
others? Certainly. Would this count as philosophy? To pose the question is
already to make it over on the terms of the academy. And to this entire
question it would still remain to consider what is to be counted as
philosophy as there is a certain amount as it is indeed contested. So my
answer here is simply an institutional one. Intriguingly over the years, and
this is one of the perks (or more accurately said one of the downsides) of
being an editor, I have received a fair bit of mail from non-academics who
feel that they should be regarded as philosophers. It goes without saying
that they themselves were seeking approbation from an academic —
otherwise they would not have been writing to me to begin with.
The task of teaching, at least as I teach the traditional texts of
philosophy, keeps one in tune with both the field and the questions that are
called perennial because they are undying: they resist ultimate solution. I
think students benefit from faculty research just to the extent that that
research is in touch with the tradition: one studies not the current work of
any given professor active in a given research field, although one may find
this of use to form one‘s own work, but and much rather to learn from that
scholar how to approach extant scholarship and above all how to read the
texts of philosophy and to learn the problems of philosophy. For me, the two
simply go together.
To comment or respond to Babette Babich‘s interview, please
send an email to : editors@purlieujournal.com
Responses will be sent to the author, with some published
online and/or in the Spring 2012 issue of Purlieu.
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1. In fact, this worry is related to Plato‘s concern, ‗who will guard the guards?‘
2. Babich, ―The Birth of kd lang‘s Hallelujah out of the ‗Spirit of Music‘: Performing Desire
and ‗Recording Consciousness‘ on Facebook and YouTube,‖ Perfect Sound Forever,
January 2012, forthcoming.
3. Interestingly enough this is the reason it is Nietzsche‘s sister, along with her co-editors,
and not Nietzsche who is the author of the infamous Will to Power published in
his name but not therefore under his authorship. I discuss this with reference to
Nietzsche and Heidegger in Babich, ―Le sort du Nachlass: le problème de l‘œuvre
posthume‖ In: Pascale Hummel, ed., Mélivres / Misbooks. Études sur l‟envers et
les travers du livre (Paris: Philogicum, 2009), pp. 123-140.
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6. See Jaron Lanier ―The City is Built to Music,‖ chapter five in Lanier, you are not a gadget
(New York: Vintage, 2010), pp. 87ff.
7. Lee Siegel, Against the Machine: Being Human in the Age of the Electronic Mob (New York:
Spiegel & Grau, 2008), p. 44.
8. Chapter Three, Ibid., pp. 47ff.
9. Here I note that contemporary digital media scholars should go and rediscover what
Lacan says about television and not just by reading Žižek and then go back and
read not just Postman but Jerry Mander to boot.
10. There are several studies of this, of course. One useful and respectable because
insider‘s account, is David B. Resnick, The Price of Truth: How Money Affects the
Norms of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) another and more
popular account, not because of its authorship, the authors are similarly
academics like Resnik, as historians of science, Naoimi Oreskes and Erik M.
Conway, Merchants of Doubt (New York: Bloomsbury, 2011), but because the
target is not, say AIDS or cancer or physics research but (and only) big tobacco
and global warming. For a discussion dedicated to the role of journals and editors
whose ultimate editorial policy is to simply block publication, see Pilkey, Orrin H.,
and Linda Pilkey-Jarvis, Useless Arithmetic: Why Environmental Scientists Can‟t
Predict the Future (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 136 and
passim. Neither scientists nor engineers, as it turns out, are willing to revise a
good model once they have one, no matter whether it models reality or not, and
this recalcitrance was the inspiration for the Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis. For a nicely
theoretical discussion, see Philip Mirowski‘s The Effortless Economy of Science
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004) as well as his earlier co-edited
collection with E.-M. Sent, Science Bought and Sold (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2002). For a more general account, see Martin Walker, Dirty
Medicine (London: Slingshot Publications, 1993). And if one really doesn‘t mind
rocking the boat, see the arguments of the important but obviously controversial
molecular biologist, Peter Duesberg‘s popular or exoteric, Inventing the AIDS Virus
(Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1995), and for a perfect scientist‘s account, see
Duesberg, et al., ―The Chemical Bases of the Various AIDS Epidemics:
Recreational Drugs, Anti-Viral Chemotherapy and Malnutrition,‖ J. Biosci., 28/4
(June, 2003): 383-412. See further Gordon Moran, Silencing Scientists and
Scholars in Other Fields: Power, Paradigm Controls, Peer Review, and Scholarly
Communication (Greenwich: Ablex Publishing, 1998).
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11. For a rare account using the tools of journalistic science, a science that has itself
recently been coopted by its sponsors, see David S. Bertolloti, Culture and
Technology (Bowling Green: Ohio University Press, 1984).
12. This is the still too-little adverted to point of Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer,
Leviathan and the Air Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). I
say too little adverted to because this ―invisible‖ point has gone without remark
while the modest one, has captivated our attention. We are all of us the modest
witness in question, just as we are all cyborg. See too for a related discussion,
similarly insufficiently noted or discussed, but it is a glorious book and
recommend it to philosophers if only for the implications to be drawn by reading
the very first page, Lawrence Principe‘s The Aspiring Adept: Robert Boyle and his
Alchemical Quest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
13. I should note the phenomenon, and it is a phenomenon, of publishing by printing press
on occasion and stamped wood cuts that constituted by Earl Nitschke‘s
extraordinary mailing of postcards and prints to a wide range of Nietzsche
scholars. As editor, I have characterized this as I feature his work in recent issue
of New Nietzsche Studies, as dynamic performance art, as an art event: corelevant here would be Nietzsche‘s own description of a letter as being akin to an
unannounced visit, shaking one up, disturbing, affecting one. The internet wishes
it could be so effective. And Earl Nitschke is particularly good at this as a
professor of industrial art and design. Thus publishing as noted at the outset with
reference to writing on the wall, has many means. Postcard art is one of them.
14. Clifford Stoll, Silicon Snake Oil: Second Thoughts on the Information Highway (New York:
Anchor Books, 1996), pp. 199ff.
15. Add to this the literality of the humanities faculty and one finds that humanities‘ faculty
members tend go along with rather than protesting such cuts. By contrast,
science faculty, less literate perhaps, certainly unused to taking orders from
librarians, often protest to high heaven when anyone proposes to cut their
subscriptions. It goes without saying that the difference in costs between
humanities subscriptions and science subscriptions are mind boggling, which
means that relatively little is gained from the complicity of the humanities
professors.
16. Heidegger, Parmenides, trans André Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana Press, 1992), p. 85.
17. See Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault
(Cambridge: Wiley, 1995) and Ivan Illich, In the Vineyard of the Text: A
Commentary to Hugh‟s Didascalicon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
18. Aaron Swartz apparently broke into a restricted area at MIT and downloaded millions of
articles from JSTOR.
19. This is an old habit, reducing Nietzsche to Emerson or Lange or Wagner as one‘s
personal inclinations prefer. Nietzsche himself found it fairly useless
philosophically speaking and spoke instead not of the originality of the Greek but
their genial qualities as masters of what he called ―the art of fruitful learning.‖
Anyone can pick up anything, the challenge is to make something of it, to ―take
up the spear from where another has left it and‖ — and this is what is hard —
―throw it further.‖ See his Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks.
20. Marcus Aurelius chides himself on the bootlessness of this, the original bookish idée
fixe in his Meditations.
21. The technology in question depends upon keeping inherently bodily issues in mind,
hence it would be profitably explored by means of phenomenology (and Ihde
should be quick to notice this aspect). The captcha website defines a captcha ―as
a program that protects websites against bots by generating and grading tests
that humans can pass but current computer programs cannot.‖ See ―CAPTCHA:
Telling Humans and Computers Apart Automatically,‖ http://www.captcha.net/.
Accessed 8:56, Pacific time. Albeit from NYC, but my computer does not know
this.
22. Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 86.
23. Of the few people who ever read the essay, a subset that regrettably (in my view as I
would have welcomed the resultant dialogue) includes no one who writes on the
topic.
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24. My essay, ―On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche‘s Lying Truth,
Heidegger‘s Speaking Language, and Philosophy‖ in Carlos G. Prado, ed., A House
Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy (Amherst, NY:
Prometheus/Humanity Books. 2003), pp. 63-103 goes back quite a bit as an
initial version of it was originally written for a conference I organized in Dubrovnik
in 1991 just before the ―war(s)‖ that dismantled Yugoslavia and what had been
other countries of the time (countries to be sure that were themselves drawn,
borderwise, following the previous world war(s)). It was revised and published four
years after that as ―Against Analysis, Beyond Postmodernism‖ in the collection I
edited (together with Debra B. Bergoffen and Simon V. Glynn, eds.), Continental
and Postmodern Perspectives in the Philosophy of Science (Avebury. Aldershot, UK/
Brookfield, USA. 1995), pp. 31-54.
25. I have a book on this topic, forthcoming in French, where the distinction and the divide
is similarly problematic: Babich, La fin de la pensée. Sur la différence et la
politique de la désunion entre philosophie analytique et philosophie continentale.
26. Thus Aquinas cites Aristotle‘s de Anima on the matter of such distinctions:
scientiae dividuntur quemadmodum et res, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed philosophia est de
ente; est enim cognitio entis, ut dicit Dionysius in epistula ad Polycarpum. Cum ergo
ens primo dividatur per potentiam et actum, per unum et multa, per substantiam et
accidens, videtur quod per huiusmodi deberent partes philosophiae distingui.‖
Aquinas, Librum Boetii de Trinitate Expositio (Quest. 5. Art. 1.)
In addition, we remember Descartes‘ identification of the ―clear and distinct‖ as the
distinctive characteristic of what might (ultimately, promissorily) be known with
certainty. In an article on this topic, Robert Sokolowski notes that the entire
impetus of Aristotle‘s characterization of his predecessors depended upon
distinguishing their lack of distinctive distinguishing. Sokolowski cites Aristotle‘s
Metaphysics 1.7 988a180-b15, noting as he does that Aristotle‘s own method
proceeds by ‗clarifying‘ what his predecessors confusedly knew. See Sokolowski,
―The Method of Philosophy: Making Distinctions,‖ The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.
51, No. 3 (Mar., 1998): 515-532. Prior to Sokowlowski, see too Hannah Arendt‘s
letter entitled ―Distinctions‖ which she sent to New York Review of Books, Volume
13, Number 12 (January 1, 1970) in reply to a review published on her book, Men
in Dark Times. Although by her own self-assessment, a political theorist rather
than a philosopher, Arendt draws upon her clearly philosophical background to
argue against her reviewer that
the point at issue is not the past but tradition, and the distinction between them: Tradition
orders the past, hands it down (tradere), interprets it, omits, selects, and
emphasizes according to a system of pre-established beliefs. Tradition is a mental
construct and as such always subject to critical examination. If I say that no
tradition can claim validity today, I do not say that the past is dead but that we
have no reliable guide through it any more, from which it follows that tradition
itself has become a part of the past.‖ Ibid.
27. I have written of course a good deal about this and I am happy to note that there is an
increasingly interest in the topic – indeed Günther Abel and Helmut Heit
organized a conference during the summer of 2010 on the theme of ―Nietzsches
Wissenschaftsphilosophie/Nietzsche‘s Philosophy of Science.‖ A full three day,
international conference and that, intriguingly enough, would not be the only
such conference recently organized on Nietzsche science. Quite independently of
such conferences, I myself begin a recent overview essay on the philosophy of
science as such with an extended reference to Nietzsche in Babich, ―Towards a
Critical Philosophy of Science: Continental Beginnings and Bugbears, Whigs and
Waterbears,‖ International Journal of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 24, No. 4
(December 2010): 343-391.
28. See the first few sections of Babich, ―Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science.‖
29. See ― ‗Hacker‘s Challenge‘ James Garvey interviews P.M. S. Hacker,‖ TPM, The
Philosopher‟s Magazine, Issue 51 ( October 25, 2010).
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30. Sally Haslanger, a professor of philosophy at MIT foregrounds this theme in her
―Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone),‖
Hypatia, 23/ 2 (2008): 210-223. That this hostile (sometimes politely called
‗chilly‘) ―culture‖ has an ideological, political, and economic basis is clear. See just
for a start, though data is notoriously difficult to collect, Miriam Solomon and
John Clarke ―The CSW Jobs for Philosophers Employment Study,‖ APA
Newsletter: Feminism and Philosophy, 8/2 (Spring 2009): 3-6. The reach of these
reflections can be fairly extensive: see Londa Schiebinger and Shannon K.
Gilmartin, ―Housework is an Academic Issue,‖ Academe, Vol. 96, No. 1 JanuaryFebruary 2010 as well as in a European context, Louise Morley, Quality and
Power in Higher Education (Society for Research into Higher Education: McGraw
Hill, 2003). For those who think that political issues are foreign to questions of
discourse analysis in the academy, see Troemel-Ploetz, ―Selling the Apolitical,‖
Discourse Society, 2/4(1991): 489-502.
31. I am sure that Michael Wreen, who argues nicely that fallacies typically regarded are
only qualifiedly so, would be comparably enlightening on the matter of this
traditional informal fallacy. I cite Wreen and others in Babich, ―Towards a Critical
Philosophy of Science.‖
32. I have elsewhere observed that some of the limitations of Peter Kingsley‘s recent work
on the presocratic tradition corresponded to his apparent limited knowledge of
Nietzsche, owing to the constraints inherent in classical studies, but not less to
the limitations of the analytic tendencies that dominate departments of
philosophy.
33. See further David Jenneman, Adorno in America (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2007) or Lorenz Jäger, Adorno: A Political Biography trans. Stewart Spencer
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).
34. This is Jennerman‘s point which he takes up from Jäger and others as well. I discuss
this in the initial sections of Babich, ―Adorno on Science and Nihilism, Animals,
and Jews,‖ Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy/Revue
canadienne de philosophie continentale, Vol. 14, No. 1, (2011): 110-145.
35. Read Principe‘s book just for the philosophical frisson of the first few pages, and read
the rest for its own sake (not to mention for useful bits on Newton).
36. Being unread is, of course, what it means to be non-influential, that is why I discussed
the elusive quality of the readerly public above.
37. There is also what one may call a boredom quotient that matters (to me) in philosophy.
Bunge has that in spades, Nietzsche rather less of it.
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